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ChangE in SCiEnCE
Vincent Lam and Christian Sachse
‘Change in science’ was the theme of the 6th meeting of the So-
ciété de Philosophie des Sciences (SPS), which occurred at the 
University of Lausanne from the 29th of June to the 1st of July 
2016. The articles in this volume, which were presented at the 
meeting, variously take up this theme, reflecting the plurality 
and complexity of approaches in the philosophy of sciences.
The institution of science (and the various sciences) is un-
dergoing changes that reflect not only different perspectives 
on the objects of the sciences, but also changes in the general 
conceptual framework within which the sciences operate. For 
instance, the cultural and technological backgrounds of sci-
entists are more heterogeneous than a generation ago. The 
way researchers work and interact has been affected by the 
internet revolution in the same way other fields have been 
affected. New forms of knowledge are emerging, yielding new 
challenges (e.g. those related to ‘big data’, which is the theme 
of the 7th meeting of the SPS in Nantes in 2018). To be suc-
cinct, science is fundamentally a dynamical process.        
Analogously, and for very similar reasons, the philosophy of 
science is also changing to capture the dynamics of science, 
but, moreover, a greater heterogeneity of backgrounds is 
starting to change philosophy of science departments. The 
contributions to this volume articulate various aspects of this 
change and are briefly introduced in what follows.  
According to Cliff Hooker’s contribution “Re-modelling 
scientific change: complex systems frames innovative prob-
lem solving”, the most general feature of the changes marking 
the contemporary state of the sciences involves the increasing 
use and study of complex systems. Hooker distinguishes three 
different but related questions pertaining to this quasi-paradigm 
shift. Firstly, what are the consequences, for science, of science 
using and studying complex systems? That question points to the 
impact of complex systems on science’s understanding of its own 
practices in, for instance, constructing scientific models, choos-
ing methods and seeking explanations. Even though there is as 
yet no consolidation of concepts and methods that could already 
be called a definite new paradigm, Hooker argues that there is an 
increasing number of cases suggesting a new paradigm of doing 
science. Secondly, what are the consequences, for philosophy of 
science, of science turning to study complex systems? Here, the 
focus is on such traditional philosophy of science subdisciplines 
as epistemology and methods. Some have identified a shift in the 
societal explanatory orientation from static structures to contin-
gent dynamical equilibria. At the metaphysical level, identity cri-
teria for complex systems are concerned less with the sameness 
of persisting components than with the sameness of dynamical 
landscape trajectory. Finally, what are the consequences of mod-
elling science as a complex system for what philosophy of science 
takes itself to be doing? That last and most important question 
in Hooker’s analysis concerns whether science itself is a complex 
system and how this might change our conception of science as 
well as of philosophy of science. For adequately modelling the dy-
namical process of science, Hooker distinguishes, among others, 
frameworks that help to identity, for instance, positive reinforce-
ment processes between science and society, while also outlining 
persisting problems in modelling science itself. Hooker concludes 
by suggesting an account of science centred on problem solving.
The contribution of Paul Weirich, “Change in the decision 
sciences”, investigates changes in science from the perspec-
tive of the generalization of scientific models. Models typical-
ly employ idealizations to control for some factors affecting 
the targeted phenomenon. While idealizations confessedly 
hold in the model but not in the actual world, general princi-
ples governing the phenomenon hold in both the world and 
the model. Within the framework of decision theory, Wei-
rich then articulates the generalizing of normative models 
in terms of relaxing certain idealizations, such as access to 
complete information and other ideal cognitive assumptions 
about rational agents. Besides other virtues, this allows us to 
accommodate additional factors relevant to the phenome-
non in question. Beyond this specific context, Weirich argues 
that this generalizing process “exemplifies a common type of 
change in science”.
Ignace Yapi in his contribution, entitled “Le bricolage évo-
lutif: un modèle pertinent des changements dans les scienc-
es”, argues for a model of the dynamics of science that takes 
into account the opportunistic recycling of old theories, 
which sometimes get reappreciated in novel, unexpected 
ways. Making a bold analogy to François Jacob’s ‘evolution-
ary tinkering’ in biology, Yapi considers several historical 
cases, notably in astronomy and in biology, where the stan-
dard Kuhnian model of scientific revolutions, involving irre-
versible ruptures with the past, seems to fundamentally miss 
crucial, ‘past-oriented’ features of the dynamics at play. Ya-
pi’s contribution supports the epistemic relevance of a plural-
ity of perspectives on the dynamics of science.      
Paleontology, which began in the 19th century as a descriptive 
discipline subordinate to geology, underwent a paleobiological 
revolution during the 20th century by becoming a theoretical 
science that was integrated into evolutionary biology. 
Although the history of paleoanthropology reflects a similar 
change – the key example being its generating the evolutionary 
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history of lineages that gave birth to Homo sapiens –  the 
paleobiological revolution is still incomplete in this field. In 
her contribution “La revolution paléobiologique a-t-elle eu 
lieu en paléoanthropologie?”, Mathilde Lequin explains 
why the change is only partial. After analysing the path that 
leads from paleontology to paleobiology and from human 
paleontology to paleoanthropology, she identifies empirical 
and epistemological limits to a paleobiological revolution in 
the field of human evolution. Such limits are notably due to 
a relatively fragmentary fossil record of hominids (compared 
to records of other taxa), as well as a result of different, 
conflicting understandings of paleobiology (a neo-Darwinian 
vs. a punctuated equilibrium understanding). Importantly, 
and linked to the above mentioned conflicting schools of 
evolutionary theory, Lequin demonstrates that there is a 
need to consider paleoanthropology not only as a branch of 
paleobiology but, as well, as one that must genuinely retain 
its anthropological dimension for adequately assessing 
paleobiological change.
The unpredictability of how science changes is regularly men-
tioned when it comes to defend the epistemic value of a free 
and curiosity-driven research against one that is primarily 
use-inspired. Baptiste Bedessem initiates a rigorous criti-
cal analysis of this “unpredictability argument” in his article, 
“L’imprévisibilité de la science: un argument pour la liberté 
de la recherche? La découverte des ARNi comme étude de 
cas”. His model case is the “discovery” of RNA interference 
(RNAi), a process in which small RNA molecules inhibit gene 
expression. It is often referenced in the debate on fundamen-
tal research, scientific freedom and governance of science. 
However, Bedessem argues that it is misleading to use this 
episode to defend a principle of scientific autonomy. Indeed, 
the unpredictable part of the discovery was inspired by use- 
or commercial-inspired research on more colourful petunias 
(plants), whereas the fundamental research only generated 
predictable results qua following rather standard methods 
for identifying the underlying, unknown mechanism of an al-
ready discovered phenomenon. Hence, Bedessem concludes 
that the unpredictability argument is often used in a superfi-
cial and misleading way. He furthermore shows why it miss-
es its target, namely by mixing the question of the genesis 
of the unexpected, which is according to him systematically 
neglected in the debate, with that of the management of the 
unexpected. One upshot of Bedessem’s analysis is that the 
distinction of these two aspects of the problem seems cate-
gorically necessary to the evaluation of both the strength and, 
more importantly, the limit of the unpredictability argument. 
In many ways, change in science is fundamentally about the 
evolution of scientific knowledge. Sophie Bary & Anouk 
Barberousse investigate the dynamics of knowledge about 
biodiversity, which lies at the meeting point of several fields 
(taxonomy, ecology, evolutionary biology, etc.) and is there-
fore characterized by some strong heterogeneity. Their arti-
cle “Le rôle des hypothèses ininterrogées dans l’étude scien-
tifique de la biodiversité des fonds marins” sheds some light 
on the role played by certain epistemically illegitimate as-
sumptions and extrapolations in this heterogenous context. 
In particular, they take as a case-study the investigation of 
deep-sea biodiversity, where scientific knowledge is strongly 
influenced by technological progress and economic factors, 
which may lead to the emergence of unwarranted hypotheses. 
 
The problem of clarifying the content and structure of evo-
lutionary theory is one of the central issues in contemporary 
philosophy of biology. Among others, it is particularly crucial 
for understanding in what sense a proper “Darwinian para-
digm”, – insofar as Origin of species is commonly thought 
a scientific revolution –, can be critically discussed. In her 
article “Existe-t-il un paradigm darwinien? Pour une ontolo-
gie historique de la théorie de l’évolution”, Nicola Bertoldi 
carefully analyses the intellectual frameworks before, at the 
time of, and after Darwin’s most important publication. For in-
stance, she defines the structure and content of Darwin’s the-
ory such that the problem of adaptive complexity of life can be 
raised and answered differently than by William Paley, with-
out reference to a strong, non-naturalistic notion of teleology 
based on an intelligent designer. Besides many other results, 
Bertoldi also shows in what sense Darwin succeeded indeed 
in imposing a functionalist and purely naturalistic perspec-
tive. Importantly, she shows why that can be seen as a change 
somewhat within a pre-existing functionalist perspective (in 
opposition to a formalist perspective) such that neither “func-
tionalism” nor “naturalism” are adequate to distinguish Dar-
winians from non-Darwinians. This episode leads Bertoldi to 
suggest a new approach called “historical ontology” as more 
adequate to the diachronic dimension of evolutionary theory. 
 
Psychology has been peculiarly sensitive to changes in cul-
ture and the socius, thereby gaining new knowledge without 
necessarily abandoning previous insights or schemata. Still, 
the image of a science that increases knowledge and increas-
ingly approximates to the truth about its object holds here 
as in other sciences – just as if there would be a final, finite 
and stable stage of truth to be discovered or to be achieved 
through ongoing scientific progress. Rather than challenging 
that picture as is done in the scientific realism debate, Feli-
cia Ghica focuses in her contribution on Ignace Meyerson’s 
very particular “historical psychology”, which conceives the 
change of psychology as central to the mind’s functioning. 
More precisely, in her article, entitled “De quelques ques-
tions que la psychologie historique d’Ignace Meyerson actu-
alise en psychologie”, she analyses in what sense Meyerson’s 
psychology has the ambition to identify the specificity of the 
human mind by making the turn to a historic, objective and 
comparative psychology. By giving up the idea of a stable 
and immutable mind and by following the idea of a contin-
uous change of psychological function, Meyerson’s approach 
makes psychology a domain without any clear anchor, which, 
of course, gives rise to many difficult epistemological is-
sues that Ghica discusses in a rich section of interrogations. 
 
Following Kuhn and other anti-realist philosophers, the 
dynamics of science is often viewed as involving strong dis-
continuities, in particular in physics, and the transition from 
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classical to quantum physics is widely taken as constituting 
a paradigmatic example of the discontinuous evolution of 
science. The latter lies at the heart of the infamous pessi-
mistic meta-induction argument against scientific realism. 
In her contribution entitled “Scientific realism and primitive 
ontology or: the pessimistic induction and the nature of the 
wave function”, Valia Allori discusses two main (realist) ap-
proaches in the ontology of quantum mechanics – namely the 
wave function ontology approach (often called wave function 
realism) and the primitive ontology approach – in the light 
of this standard argument in the debate on scientific realism. 
Considering a specific version of scientific realism (explana-
tionist realism), she argues that the primitive ontology ap-
proach is in a better position with respect to the pessimistic 
meta-induction argument than the approach centred on the 
quantum wave function, since the latter irreducibly involves 
a radical departure from the classical picture. So, according 
to Allori, within the appropriate ontological framework, the 
transition from classical to quantum physics need not be dis-
continuous after all. Her contribution crucially interrelates 
epistemic and ontological aspects of the debate on scientif-
ic realism with that of the ontology of quantum mechanics. 
 
In a certain sense, the contribution “Particle creation and an-
nihilation: two bohemian approaches” of Andrea Oldofre-
di investigates to what extent the smooth transition from 
classical to quantum mechanics, as advocated by the propo-
nents of the primitive ontology approach, also includes quan-
tum field theory, which is the broader quantum theoretical 
framework for high energy particle physics. Oldofredi high-
lights the fact that the primitive ontology approach to (Bohm-
ian) quantum field theory does not lead to a unique ontolog-
ical picture. For instance, the primitive ontology of quantum 
field theory can either involve the stochastic evolution of 
(Bohmian) particles being literally created and annihilated 
or a fixed number of particles with deterministic dynamics. 
Furthermore, he argues that the primitive ontology approach 
does not solve the ambiguities of quantum field theory, so 
may rather point to an effective ontology (despite its name). 
 
Many thanks to the authors for their inspiring and orig-
inal contributions, the reviewers for their helpful feed-
back all along the evaluation process, and to the team 
of Lato Sensu for their precious work. Enjoy reading. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
